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ABSTRACT: Discipline and Punish analyzes the role of collecting, managing, and operationalizing 
data in disciplinary institutions. Foucault’s discussion is compared to contemporary forms of sur-
veillance and security practices using algorithmic data processing. The article highlights im-
portant similarities and differences regarding the way data processing plays a part in subjectiva-
tion. This is also compared to Deleuzian accounts and Foucault’s later discussion in Security, Ter-
ritory, Population. Using these results, the article argues that the prevailing focus on transparency 
and accountability in the discussion of algorithmic applications needs to be amended with a per-
spective on different forms of subjectivity and ensuing power relations. 
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Algorithms have become a problem. Or, rather, “algorithm” has become one of two terms under 
which a particular set of problems concerning information technology has been summarized. The 
other term is “Big Data”. Both refer to information technologies that seem to have become a little 
more intelligent, autonomous, or capable than the forms of automation we already know. Pro-
gresses in machine learning, pattern recognition, data mining, and similar fields of computer sci-
ence made it possible to produce systems that work on more complex input than just database 
tables (images, natural language texts, movement patterns, market data etc.), and that somehow 
automatically and intelligently – or at least adaptively – react to that input. Such systems are 
meant to automatically place ads on websites, buy and sell stock, detect suspicious behavior in 
CCTV footage, identify potential terrorists at the border, decide who gets parole, design build-
ings, and soon drive our cars. 




This plethora of actual or potential use cases of “algorithms” has led to repeated calls for 
oversight and for an ethics or governance of algorithms.1 Very often, the opaque, hidden func-
tionality of the algorithm is a central concern of these debates. For example, Frank Pasquale has 
eloquently criticized the “black box society” in which automatic judgments determine even im-
portant decisions in major companies or on Wall Street.2 The algorithms that are used in these 
cases are not accessible, they are rather black-boxed. Pasquale shows that all kinds or egotistic or 
even illegal corporate interests can be hidden in algorithms. They can also have adverse effects 
that no one intended. The metaphor of opening black boxes, which Pasquale uses, is exemplary 
for a growing number of texts that center on the same issue: If the algorithms determine im-
portant things in our lives, then we should know how they function and what they really do. Ac-
cess to their inner workings is considered the prime lever for an ethics or governance of algo-
rithms. 
This standpoint has been challenged from various perspectives. One strand of critique en-
gages with the exclusionary focus on the algorithm that reduces the outcome of a complex socio-
technical system to just one element.3 Elsewhere, I discuss the residues of humanist concepts of 
subjectivity that are projected on the algorithm in attempts to find a single, responsible instance 
for the results of information processing.4 Another critical point is the question to which extent 
algorithms have the agency that – at least on a discursive level – is bestowed on them, and where 
this agency is located if not in the algorithm.5  
This paper provides a further argument why the repeated demands for supervision of al-
gorithms, for opening black boxes, fall short of their own aim: the role data play in the applica-
tions of pertinent algorithms and the ways data are implicated in ensuing processes of subjectiva-
tion and power relations. To that aim, several concepts in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish con-
cerning data are re-read concerning their application to current algorithmic systems. In Discipline 
and Punish, Foucault discusses the beginnings of data-based sciences and the subjectivating effects 
of data and “apparatus[es] of writing”6. Thus, if the central question of an ethics of algorithms is: 
“What do algorithms do to subjects?”, with Foucault this question gets a new angle: “The algo-
                                                 
1 Malte Ziewitz, ed., Special Issue: Governing Algorithms, Science, Technology and Human Values, 41:1 (2016). 
2 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).  
3 Tarleton Gillespie, “The Relevance of Algorithms”, in Media Technologies, ed. Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo Bocz-
kowski, and Kirsten Foot (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014) 167-194. 
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262525374.003.0009; Daniel Neyland, “Bearing Accountable Witness to the 
Ethical Algorithmic System Science”, Technology & Human Values, 41:1 (2016), 50-76. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243915598056.  
4 Tobias Matzner, “The Human is Dead – Long Live the Algorithm! Human-algorithmic ensembles and liberal 
subjectivity”, Theory, Culture & Society (forthcoming).  
5 Lucas D. Introna, “Algorithms, Governance, and Governmentality: On Governing Academic Writing Science”, 
Technology & Human Values, 41 no. 1 (2016): 17-49. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243915587360.  
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1995), 190. Henceforth cited as “DP”. 
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rithm and the data it uses constitute these subjects in the first place.” In this paper, I will trace 
such moments of subjectivation in contemporary uses of “smart”, “intelligent,” or “autonomous” 
algorithmic systems based on data. As mentioned in the beginning, there is a plethora of use cases 
that each come with their own ways of subjectivation. Hence, I will limit myself to examples from 
surveillance and security technologies. However, it is important to notice that they are complexly 
intertwined with automated analyses of data in other parts of our lives.7  
I start by analyzing the interrelation of algorithms and data. I then shortly summarize ex-
isting critical accounts, in particular Deleuze’s Postscript on the Societies of Control and several texts 
that are inspired or derived from this work. I show that these texts delineate important implica-
tions of current algorithmic systems, which, however, should be amended using Foucault’s theo-
ry. I thus trace elements of his discussion of using data in Discipline and Punish and discuss their 
use for analyzing current applications of information technology. In conclusion I summarize the 
implications of this analysis for requirements of transparency and oversight.  
 
Algorithms and data  
Very generally speaking, an algorithm can be understood as a series of steps executed in order to 
perform a certain task. In terms of computer science, an algorithm often refers to a certain level of 
abstraction that summarizes in human terms the essential steps to perform a task, which are then 
broken down to machine-readable code via programming languages and compilers or interpret-
ers.8 On a related, but not quite the same level of abstraction, the concept “algorithm” has become 
a matter of concern in ethics of technology as well as in public debates. Here, “algorithm” refers 
to a particular subset of programs, namely those that react in an adaptive manner to rather com-
plex input. For quite some time, the archetypical case of computing has been the handling of da-
tabases that access and manage entries using predefined fields (names, addresses etc.). Now, in-
formation technologies process much more complex and ambiguous data and their meaning is no 
longer predefined but emerges during queries. For example, targeted advertising collects hetero-
geneous data like the make of the computer that is used, the operating system, the sites visited 
online, the apps installed, the entries that have been liked or shared on social media, the location 
of the internet access, and more. Within these data, algorithms try to detect patterns or regulari-
ties that are meant to hint at products that the user would probably consider buying. IBM has 
suggested using one of its software products to assess the large number of refugees that have 
tried to enter Europe since 2011 after the crisis in the Middle East. They claim to use data from 
such different sources as lists of casualties in the war, assessments of illegal markets in the “deep 
                                                 
7 Tobias Matzner, “Beyond Data as Representation: The Performativity of Big Data in Surveillance,” Surveillance 
& Society 14 no. 2 (2016): 197–210. 
8 Donald E. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 1. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1973), xiv–9. 




web”, openly accessible social media, phone calls, or parking tickets.9 Thus, the “smart”, “intelli-
gent”, or “autonomous” algorithms share the common property that an essential part of their effi-
cacy is based on the data which is used. They are meant to “detect” patterns, rules, associations, 
or regularities in the data. From that point of view, the data carries much of the epistemic load. 
The label “Big Data” is often used to emphasize the variety of data such systems process, the 
huge amount (e.g. data from all users of sites like Facebook or Twitter) of data that is involved, 
and the fact that the systems use data that constantly changes or updates.10 
The purported informative value of these data has been challenged on several levels. A 
number of important papers show the difficulties of defining an epistemology of such automati-
cally processed data.11 They argue that many of the approaches in data analytics cannot derive the 
knowledge from the data they purport to do – or at least do not necessarily produce these results. 
Applied to surveillance and security technologies, these critiques often amount to the claim that 
the persons under surveillance, or those that are examined at airports or borders, for example, are 
not correctly described by the data. Generally, this critique is based on questioning what data rep-
resent.  
Such an assessment could be the result of oversight in the form of opening black boxes. It 
could scrutinize the way categories or patterns are formed and determine whether they produce 
the desired insights. Since the outcome is contingent on the input data, such scrutiny, however, is 
partly only possible in hindsight.12 On a more fundamental level, such scrutiny accepts the im-
plicit assumption that subjects can be sorted into categories which can be compared with their 
representation in data. The task of oversight would then be to ascertain whether the data analytics 
do justice to these subjects or not. Using Foucault’s insights, we can see that this is too limited a 
perspective.  
 
Foucault, Deleuze, and Data 
When discussing surveillance using data, one of the prime resources in Surveillance Studies is 
Deleuze’s Postscript for the Societies of Control.13 Many of the differences and developments that 
                                                 
9 Patrick Tucker, “Refugee or Terrorist? IBM Thinks Its Software Has the Answer”, accessed August 10, 2016: 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/refugee-or-terrorist-ibm-thinks-its-software-has-
answer/125484/ 
10 The term Big Data is both a concept used in academic papers and in marketing and advertising. Thus, there is 
a variety of definitions; for an overview, see Rob Kitchin, “Big Data, new epistemologies and paradigm shifts”, 
Big Data & Society, 1 no. 1 (2014): 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714528481.  
11 Kitchin, “Big Data, new epistemologies and paradigm shifts”; Louise Amoore, “Data Derivatives: On the 
Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times”, Theory, Culture & Society, 28 no. 6 (2011): 24-43. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276411417430.  
12 For example, Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica, “Machine Bias”, ac-
cessed August 10, 2016: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing 
13 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript for the Societies of Control”, October 59, 3-7. Henceforth cited as “PS”. 
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Deleuze singles out as characteristic for the shift from the disciplinary societies described in Disci-
pline and Punish to societies of control are easily linked to computerized data processing. Thus, the 
spread of information technology is taken as one of the reasons why Foucauldian theory shows 
its historical situatedness and needs to be amended. Deleuze emphasizes three important aspects.  
First, Discipline and Punish focuses on closed institutions (PS 3). In contrast, control is pos-
sible everywhere. What Deleuze cites as Guattari’s imagination of constantly being tracked (PS 7) 
has long become reality. The “apparatuses of writing” follow us wherever we go – or rather we 
happily take them along.  
Second, the normalizing or homogenizing character of the institutions vanishes. Both soci-
eties of control and disciplinary societies need data. But where the latter utilize the data to estab-
lish norms and “mold” (PS 3) individuals into a mass, the former need data to provide incentives, 
nudges, or stimuli for individuals in constant competition and perpetual training (PS 5).  
Third, and partly as consequence of the second aspect, the homogenous individual loses 
importance. It breaks apart into a mass of data points and samples from various institutions or 
areas of life that can be moved and recombined without any claim for grasping the totality of a 
human life. Deleuze’s neologism “dividual” has inspired several prominent concepts, from Hag-
garty and Ericsson’s “data double”14 to Louise Amoore’s “data derivative”15. All these notions 
express that the individual is no longer important, whereas the many bits and pieces of data that 
are “extracted” are.16 They can be rather freely used, compared, transferred, and processed, creat-
ing new distinctions, groups, values, and needs for action. Thus, they seem to inherit a certain 
suspicion against motives of subjectivation in Deleuzian theory. They are also certainly inspired 
by the ease of copying and moving data. Deleuze’s example is financial products that are no 
longer related to gold or any other “real” objects, and the value of which is consequently purely 
virtual (PS 5).  
In fact, this Deleuzian perspective has inspired important steps in the discussion of data-
based surveillance. It moves the focus away from the effects of being watched towards what can 
be done with the results of being watched, in particular data. This runs counter to the discussions 
that have long been central to Surveillance Studies, and which foreground Foucault’s idea of the 
panopticon, the internalization of the gaze etc. But as will be shown in the next sections, Foucault 
also has important things to say about the use of data that are still relevant today. In particular, 
Discipline and Punish provides a rewarding starting point for looking at the details of data pro-
cessing practices, to which Deleuze alludes, and their effects on subjects. In fact, in many of the 
areas where data-based surveillance is used, subjectivizing moments happen. These no longer 
form an enclosing totality, but are rather heterogeneous, instantaneous, even surprising at times. 
                                                 
14 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, ”The surveillant assemblage”, The British Journal of Sociology 51 
(2000): 605-622. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071310020015280.  
15 Amoore, “Data Derivatives”. 
16 Haggerty and Ericson, “The surveillant assemblage”. 




This might seem to be in contrast to the way discipline works in Foucault’s text. But his discus-
sion of data elaborates many details of practices that create and use data and their contributions 
to the subjectivizing effects he describes. Many of these details can be found in contemporary da-
ta-based surveillance. But not only the similarities of contemporary forms of data-based surveil-
lance and those analyzed by Foucault are elucidating, so are the differences. In this sense, the dis-
cussion does not aim at a coherent analysis of the disciplinary character of data-based normaliza-
tion. The individual cases are too diverse and complexly interrelated to do that. Instead I want to 
provide fruitful perspectives derived from Discipline and Punish which show that current uses of 
algorithms and data in surveillance are not only an issue of opaque algorithms or biased data, but 
entail new forms of subjectivation.  
 
Data in Discipline and Punish and today 
 
Repetition, Regularity, and Heterogeneous Moments of Subjectivation 
In the chapter on “discipline”, Foucault argues that at the end of the 17th century, “the threshold 
of description” began to decrease. Being looked at and chronicled was no longer a privilege. De-
scription becomes “a means of control and a method of domination” and consequently, the doc-
uments produced are “no longer a monument for future memory, but a document for possible 
use” (DP 191). One particular example of such a “possible use” is the examination, as Foucault 
exemplifies regarding the shift from 17th to 18th century hospital regulations. They prescribe rou-
tinized, regular, daily examinations that even have to take place during holidays (DP 185-6). Simi-
larly, the importance of regular examinations in schools was highlighted – up to a daily interval. 
Consequently, Foucault calls them a “sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination” (DP 186). 
This has consequences for the data collected. They are not just produced and stored like chroni-
cles and protocols, they are also updated on a daily basis. Furthermore, the examination is not just 
the production of data. The routinized daily practices immediately produce effects for those ex-
amined. “The examination did not simply mark the end of an apprenticeship; it was one of its 
permanent factors; it was woven into it through a constantly repeated ritual of power” (DP 186). 
The processes of education or training are geared towards the next examination. They are backed 
by another set of “innovations of disciplinary writing [that are] concerned [with] the correlation 
of these elements, the accumulation of documents, their seriation, the organization of comparative 
fields making it possible to classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms” (DP 
190). Thus, beyond the direct involvement with the pupils, patients, or inmates, new routines of 
data processing are established. Their results are fed back into the daily practices of training and 
education, which in turn need to be examined. This shows that neither the data nor the judgments 
drawn from them (norms, categories etc.) are static. They need regular updates, curation, and 
processing.  
Closed institutions formed the locus where such regular and routinized practices could 
emerge: the inmates, patients, pupils, soldiers where always at disposal. Yet the efficacy of such 
practices is not necessarily tied to closed institutions. Today, information technology allows data 
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to be stored and transported quickly. At the same time, sensors are becoming more widespread 
and mobile. Finally, many more aspects of our lives are managed through IT systems, which 
means that a lot of data is already available. Hence the production of data, their processing and 
analysis, as well as the actions taken based on data, can happen at different times and different 
places. Data thus have long become independent of the spatial configuration of closed institutions 
as well as the particular daily schedules they impose, but nevertheless the regularity and repeti-
tion of creating and analyzing data still remains important.  
Foucault used the expression “apparatus for uninterrupted examination” for schools, 
where uninterrupted in fact meant daily. Current IT systems allow the intensification of sampling 
to intervals of several times a second. In fact, one of the defining characteristics of Big Data is ve-
locity (the other two are volume and variety).17 This does not only refer to the speed of data pro-
cessing, but also to the immediacy with which data is available – up to the point where people 
speak of real-time data (e.g. location tracking via smartphones).18 Of course, such promises and 
rhetoric have to be taken with care. But their existence shows that data-processing practices and 
the knowledge derived from them are still structured by repetition and regularity linked to a de-
mand for ever more data that is always actualized – or even more so.  
This structure is relevant to the subjectivizing effects of data and their use. In Discipline and 
Punish, examinations and apparatuses of writing are discussed in the section on the means of cor-
rect training. They enable a progress from military exercise that required the exact and homoge-
nous reproduction of movement like marching patterns from all soldiers. The processes of writing 
make each individual “a case” (DP 191). This allows the individualized selection of lessons, as-
signment of classes, corrective punishment, and similar means. Thus, subjectivation is essentially 
achieved through repeated individualized moments of measurement, judgment, and correspond-
ing training. For example, the assignment of classes at the École Militaire is described as “classifi-
catory, penal distribution […] carried out at short intervals” (DP 181). The effects of these means 
can quickly be tested again, new measures taken, and so on. Every achievement is at the same 
time reason for further examinations and further training. Thus, subjectivation through training, 
or subjectivation through data is spread out in time over many moments of measurement, classi-
fication, and selection of appropriate treatment or training.  
This parallelism of creating data – of practices of writing, management, and analysis – and 
their subjectivating effects through training and exercise is not that straightforward in current, 
digital uses of data. The accrual and analysis of data seems to have increased since data is so easi-
ly stored and transmitted, whereas the routinized exposure to being classified, ranked, even spa-
tially redistributed based on data, which prevailed in enclosing institutions, is no longer given in 
many cases. The important lesson, however, is Foucault’s insight that subjectivation is not a sin-
gular event; it is distributed among many moments of creating data and ensuing actions. Thus, it 
                                                 
17 Kitchin, “Big Data, new epistemologies and paradigm shifts”. 
18 Ibid. 




is important to notice that these subjectivizing moments have not vanished – even if they are no 
longer concentrated in one place and no longer follow a predictable temporary pattern. For ex-
ample, people are spatially distributed based on data at the airport – at least once the “checkpoint 
of the future” envisaged by the International Association of Airlines is in place. This is a system 
that collects and processes all kinds of data about passengers in order to provide a risk assess-
ment even before they arrive at the airport. Based on that assessment, passengers will encounter 
different security measures, where the time-consuming and dissatisfying checkpoint we know 
today will only be one option for those with highest risk scores.19 Increasingly, persons are 
stopped at borders and relegated to further scrutiny based on data that has been collected and 
analyzed beforehand.20 Similar to the “checkpoint of the future,” huge databases are meant to 
create a “a more person-centric approach that allows to distinguish between certain groups of 
travelers, and in particular allows certain groups to benefit from a more facilitated check at the 
borders when they come to Europe”. 21 This will also include registered traveler programs with 
voluntary pre-checks.  
Here we encounter quite a spectrum of subjectivizing effects. While some travelers will 
perform Deleuzian (self-)control in trying to become eligible for registered traveler programs, 
others will be confronted with disciplinary mechanisms of detention or refusal to enter the coun-
try. This shows that both perspectives need not be opposed, as they can complement each other. 
Much of the liberal (self-)control Deleuze analyzes happens in spaces whose fringes or borders 
have come to the attention of all kinds of surveillance and policing. Here, at the border, subjecti-
vizing moments like the ones described above using Foucault’s theory prevail. 
A different form of subjectivizing moments based on data is brought about by the use of 
data-mining tools for police work. Software that is already in use in the US assesses the subjects of 
emergency calls prior to the arrival of the police. The officers can calculate a risk score of the per-
sons they are about to encounter, using a software that scans “billions of data points, including 
arrest reports, property records, commercial databases, deep Web searches and the man’s social-
media postings.”22 Many of these data points do not at all relate to criminal activity. Yet the re-
                                                 
19 Andreas Baur-Ahrens, Marco Krüger, Regina Ammicht Quinn, Matthias Leese and Tobias Matzner: How 
Smart Is “Smart Security”? Exploring Data Subjectivity and Resistance. Final Report. Tübingen: IZEW 2015. 
Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10900/66898. Doi:10.15496/publikation-8318. 
20 Adey, Peter: Borders, identification and surveillance. In Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, ed. Da-
vid Lyon, Kirstie Ball and Kevin D. Haggerty (London: Routledge, 2012), 193-201. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203814949.ch3_1_a.  
21 Henrik Nielsen, Head of the unit for Border Management and Return Policy in the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, quoted in Julien Jeandesboz, “Smartening border security 
in the European Union: An associational inquiry”, Security Dialogue, 47 no. 4 (2016): 292-309, here 297. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010616650226.  
22 Justin Jouvenal, “The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat ‘score,’” Washington Post, 
accessed October 27, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-
surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html. 
Foucault Studies, No. 23, pp. 27-45 
 35 
sults of that software determine the means the police will select to deal with persons that so far 
have been identified only by an emergency call. The data-based judgment can lead to decisions 
like gun use or calling negotiators, thus influencing the subjectivity of the respective persons in 
decisive ways. Again, this includes disciplinary mechanisms, but based on a norm that is based 
on data and much more flexibly determined than the predetermined norms that Foucault dis-
cusses. Thus, the subjectivating moments that Foucault describes – classification, distribution, 
examination etc. – are heterogeneous and distributed today. Often, the institutions involved are 
not even discernible for the emerging subject, but such subjectivating moments still happen. The 
way these data-based “judgments” come to pass is discussed in the next section.  
 
The mass and the (in)dividual 
Although the disciplinary subjectivation of the individual is central to Discipline and Punish, it 
never concerns the individual alone. It is always a matter of the relation of the individual and a 
“population” (DP 190) within which the individual is individualized. The closed institutions did 
not only provide the possibility to create new corpora of circumspect data about the individuals 
which inhabit them. They also allowed the organization of these individuals into a comparable 
whole. Such organization is initially based on a predefined requirement for everyone: to march in 
line, to work after the clock, to sit in hierarchized school benches and work through the respective 
lessons (DP 174-5). Observing the performance relative to these aims allows the judgement of the 
individual based on departing from the rule (DP 178). Yet with the progress of data-based train-
ing, the rules are no longer the fixed demand by some kind of external authority. Individual ac-
tions, Foucault writes, are refed to “a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differ-
entiation and the principle of a rule to be followed” (DP 182). The rule itself can “be made to func-
tion as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum towards which one 
must move” (DP 182-3). These are criteria derived from observation of substantial groups of in-
mates, pupils, soldiers, or patients. Thus, as mentioned before, the apparatuses of disciplinary 
writing do not only concern the production of data about single individuals, but also create the 
possibility to store, create, and analyze these data to establish means, norms, and rules (DP 190). 
The examination as a combination of “observing hierarchy and normalizing judgment” (DP 184) 
enables two interrelated moments: “the constitution of the individual as a describable, analyzable 
object” and “the constitution of a comparative system that made possible the measurement of 
overall phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calcula-
tion of gaps between the individuals, their distribution in a given ‘population’” (DP 190). The ap-
paratus of writing constitutes both the homogeneity of the population and the ways in which in-
dividuality within that system is established. Therefore, as many individuals as possible need to 
be observed since the greater the number, the higher the quality of the knowledge produced and 
thus the more effective the entire institution.  
Deleuze addresses this aspect of Discipline and Punish as well. “The disciplinary societies 
have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative 
numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass” (PS 5). Thus, the disciplines consti-




tute “those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each mem-
ber of that body” (PS 5). However, he argues, we no longer deal with the pair of mass and indi-
vidual in societies of control. “Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, data, 
markets, or ‘banks’” (PS 5). A new “dividualized” logic of personalized incentives, corrections, or 
adaptions emerges, rather than immersion or submission into a mass. Deleuze elucidates this new 
logic with regard to money, its loosely regulated flows that are only locally modulated, with 
short-term adjustments and aims rather than the long-term projects of disciplinary correction. 
Here, Deleuze certainly notices important differences concerning temporality. But the salience of 
locality and relationality that comes with the transition from individual/mass to dividual/samples 
too quickly dismisses the important issue of context for all kinds of data.  
The organization of data no longer corresponds so obviously to the organization that pro-
duces it as it did in a closed institution, but that does not mean that the structure of a whole or a 
“population” that counts as reference is no longer necessary. In fact, creating such structures is 
one of the most elementary tasks of every “data science”. While in so called “supervised” systems 
experts’ knowledge is necessary to determine what has to be detected in the first place, “unsuper-
vised” systems build their own categories based on data.23 Rather than looking for something in 
the data, these systems are meant to tell us what to look for. They promise to find novel relations, 
associations, or rules to single out suspects. All these methods, as diverse as they may be in detail, 
need a measure of similarity to form the rules. They need to render data comparable and within 
these comparisons something has to stand out. Hence, data about “innocents” – “normal” data – 
is necessary too. Even experts who consciously select training data for supervised systems usually 
extend this with “negative examples”, i.e. data that do not exhibit the wanted features, to increase 
the discriminatory performance of the system. This illustrates that even flexible norms based on 
samples and data presuppose the organization of a population or larger context. 
Jürgen Link has described a similar flexibilization of norms. He distinguishes two forms of 
normalization: protonormalization, based on “the establishment of the borders of normality that 
are as fixed as possible for the longest possible span of time, and through zones of tolerance that 
are as restricted as possible”; and flexible normalism, where “the limits of normality are managed 
[…] in the most flexible manner possible and are fixed for the shortest possible span of time. 
Zones of tolerance and transition are established to be as ‘broad’ as possible, so that short-term 
adjustments remain possible, despite the unforeseen dynamic of statistical values.”24  
Many of the data-based surveillance practices seem to conform to the model of flexible 
normalism: norms are fixed for a short term only and constantly updated. There are, however, 
differences. In particular, there are no zones of tolerance. In a sense, in the search for suspects, the 
attention has moved from the center of the bell curve to the fringes. Rather than aiming for the 
                                                 
23 Theodoridis, Sergios & Koutrumbas, Konstantinos, Pattern Recognition (Burlington: Academic Press, 2008), 7. 
24 Jürgen Link, “From the ‘Power of the Norm’ to ‘Flexible Normalism’: Considerations after Foucault,” Cultural 
Critique 57, no. 1 (2004): 14–32, here 28. https://doi.org/10.1353/cul.2004.0008.  
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normal, surveillance looks for the exceptional, the outlier, the high-risk individual, which has its 
contemporary archetype in the suspect of terrorism, who cannot be hedged by the liberal means 
of control exemplified as flexible normalism. In the latter case, a lot of deviance is tolerated be-
cause this inclusion in the mechanisms of normalism will eventually lead to adaptation to the 
norm. The high-risk individual, however, is separated, excluded, treated differently, which ac-
cording to Link is the logic of protonormalization. This is tied to moments of threat, of imminent 
danger, as discussed below in section 4.3. However, it is also tied to disciplinary mechanisms that 
use a flexible norm. Link characterizes protonormalization as having an “other-direction”, where-
as flexible normalism has an “inner-direction”: subjects “’normalize’ themselves”.25 Yet while da-
ta-based practices have led to all kinds of self-relations which could be described that way, the 
same data is also used to create outer-directed moments, as my examples of airport security, bor-
ders, or police work illustrate – but still regarding flexible norms.  
That ambivalence can be grasped using Foucault’s own distinction of normation and nor-
malization in his lectures at the Collège de France from 1977/1978. He contrasts the “disciplines” 
with the statistical normalization he identifies in the treatment of smallpox in the eighteenth cen-
tury:  
 
In the disciplines one started from a norm, and it was in relation to the training carried out with refer-
ence to the norm that the normal could be distinguished from the abnormal. Here, instead, we have a 
plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the operation of normali-
zation consists in establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality.26 
 
In the case of disciplines, the norm is fixed and disciplinary mechanisms try to form subjects ac-
cording to that norm. Because “disciplinary normalization goes from the norm to the final divi-
sion between the normal and the abnormal,” Foucault concludes that “what is involved in disci-
plinary techniques is a normation […] rather than normalization.”27 In the treatment of smallpox, 
detailed data allowed the tracing of several normalities for different parts of the population, e.g. 
based on age, milieu or profession.28 These data thus inform the procedures taken in confronting 
the disease. Here, the “normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it.”29  
This is much closer to data-based surveillance where data are supposed to tell us what to 
look for. For Foucault, however, this development is intertwined with a shift from individual cas-
es, which reign in the hospital as a disciplinary institution, towards the population. The new ap-
paratus does not separate the sick from the healthy, but treats the population as a whole and 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 29. 
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identifies distributions of the sickness among them. The focus again lies on normalities, on find-
ing apt treatment for different social groups. In the case of suspicion based on data-based surveil-
lance, the norm is mainly interesting because it is used again to separate the normal from abnor-
mal cases.  
Consequently, while the norm is derived from the data in the new form Foucault analyzes, 
it is used in disciplinary measures that erect “walls,” which Link takes to be a particular trait of 
protonormalization.30 New processes of data-analysis promise a “more individualized” approach 
to security, with a profile involving enough data to enable unique verdicts rather than generaliz-
ing judgments. Thus, the norms derived from the data are used to judge individual cases, which 
for Foucault is an element of the disciplines. In sum, while the norms are flexibly derived from 
data, the subjectivizing moments they enable still retain elements of disciplinary mechanisms. We 
thus deal with a hybrid form of normation and normalization. 
Importantly, the use of data-based verdicts in these subjectivizing practices does not mean 
that the other, more flexible forms of normalism or the dividualized forms of control do not take 
place too. As argued above, security and (self-)control function quite differently within liberal 
Western societies (which are also Link’s focus) and on their borders or in exclusionary zones 
within them. Today, the same data can be harnessed for either form. In part, the data we use in 
our daily flexible normalism in the West is parasitized for subjectivizing practices by security 
agencies and police forces.31 In comparison to Foucault’s description of apparatuses of writing in 
disciplinary institutions, not everybody whose data is gathered is equally also affected by the sub-
jectivizing measures that are infused with the power based on these processes. In a closed institu-
tion, there is a certain parallelism: everyone is monitored and examined, everyone is trained and 
corrected. Today, the power to subjectivate based on data is still constituted by the collection and 
organization of data from everyone under observation. But the effects of this subjectivizing power 
are distributed quite unequally. Some of them focus on the borders and fringes of the societies of 
those who “have nothing to hide.” Others implicate several forms of subjectivity at the same time. 
For example, the aforementioned study on the “checkpoint of the future” shows that the primary 
aim of airlines is to make security screenings more efficient and less annoying for valuable cus-
tomers while maintaining the current level of protection, rather than increasing the level of securi-
ty.32 Thus, not only suspects, but also profitable customers are to be discerned in the data. There is 
an increasing group of people about whom data is gathered and analyzed, but the assessments 
made based on these data concern others. Thus by allowing to be monitored or even voluntarily 
providing data (e.g. in order to use “free” services online or to apply for registered traveler bene-
fits), they contribute to the establishment of the subjectivizing force of that data, even if not to 
their own subjectivation. 
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When the norms derived from the data are used to focus on suspects, rare events, and out-
liers, this also entails a particular temporal relation of judgments based on data and certain deeds 
and events. Foucault analyzed this relation regarding his notion of delinquency. 
 
Judging events and lives 
Besides the chapter on the means of correct training, Foucault’s discussion of delinquency is one 
of the most important sections in Discipline and Punish regarding the use of data. The figure of the 
delinquent stands at the center of the emerging “punitive system” and is distinguished from the 
convict. A convict is defined only by the committed criminal deed. For the delinquent, the convic-
tion is merely the start of an intensive collection of information concerning the personal develop-
ment and social circumstances of the criminal. This information is used to define the criminal, 
rather than just a criminal act:  
 
The legal punishment bears upon an act; the punitive technique on a life; it falls to this punitive tech-
nique, therefore, to reconstitute all the sordid detail of a life in the form of knowledge, to fill in the gaps 
of that knowledge and to act upon it by a practice of compulsion. It is a biographical knowledge and a 
technique for correcting individual lives. (DP 252)  
 
This intensive collection of biographical data combined with psychological investigations became 
an important element of the punitive system. A new form of knowledge emerged that “establish-
es the ‘criminal’ as existing before the crime or even outside it” (DP 252). At first, this meant a 
change in the corrective processes: the life, i.e. biographical development, has to be addressed in 
making the delinquent a better person. The punitive system thus creates biographical knowledge 
of the past, or rather a biographical knowledge that establishes the past as that which defines the 
deed.  
This way, the criminal act in itself loses its importance as the defining instant of criminali-
ty. Since this particular form of knowledge establishes the criminal as existing before the act, 
those features that start to be discernible in the individuals’ biographies before the act gain im-
portance and at a certain point overshadow the criminal act itself as the defining instance. Yet, 
this collection of knowledge is not limited to the interrelation of several elements of a single biog-
raphy. The “triple point of view of psychology, social position and upbringing” (DP 252) detects 
all kinds of features in the new corpus of data that eventually turn the delinquent into a “quasi 
natural class” (DP 253). This new form of the criminal is to an important extent the product of the 
collection of data about many different individuals in a form that renders them comparable. Not 
only prisons but also courts are influenced by this new form of knowledge: “[…] it is this delin-
quency that must be known, assessed, measured, diagnosed, treated when sentences are passed.” 
(DP 255). It also influences the writing of legal codes as “anomaly”, “deviation”, and “potential 
danger” (DP 255). Again, we notice the salience of data-based practices in measuring, in detecting 
anomalies and deviations.  




This Foucauldian analysis shows that from the very beginning of the collection of 
knowledge about delinquents, it came with the potential of prediction. Since this knowledge es-
tablishes the criminal as existing before the act, it provides techniques for collecting the necessary 
biographical data – rather than data about a crime – and for classifying and sorting it. It also 
moved this logic from treating criminals after conviction towards the decision of the court itself, 
which no longer defines criminal acts but diagnoses delinquent lives. From that point on it is a 
rather small step to try to detect such delinquent individuals before they commit a crime – the 
essential idea of many data-based surveillance systems. Such a move is possible since the 
knowledge centered on delinquency produces the comparability of biographical features and en-
suing classes, which needs the criminal act as a defining moment only temporarily in the creation 
of this knowledge. This Foucauldian reading of delinquency provides a differentiated view of the 
temporality of prediction.  
The prevailing Deleuzian view on these matters in Surveillance Studies and Security Stud-
ies has been significantly affected by Brian Massumi’s text on preemption.33 Massumi differenti-
ates prevention from preemption. Prevention, following his conception, is based on the identifica-
tion of causes for a threat, and “[o]nce the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are 
sought to avoid their realization”34. On the contrary, preemption aims at an “unknown un-
known”35. It is based on a potential threat, but we do not know when, how, and through whom it 
will materialize. Thus, the only possible remedy, following the logic of preemption, is to act now, 
to take action before the threat materializes. By taking this action in the present, the preemptive 
logic produces its own cause. The actions taken to prevent the future have immediate, present 
effects. This entails that the future event, in the form that has been predicted, never happens, be-
cause the present action already changes its possibility. At the same time, however, it is re-
instantiated: if it could have happened before we acted pre-emptively, it could happen again.  
Massumi’s analysis has explanatory power regarding military strategies, the recent 
preemptive wars, the “war on terror” etc. But the specific form of rendering the future actionable 
in the present that Massumi analyzes cannot explain all efforts of current attempts at detecting 
suspicious behavior based on data.36 The growing surveillance apparatus since 9/11 attests to the 
fact that security agencies all over the world do not content themselves with dealing with “un-
known unknowns” – the central role they play in the logic of preemption notwithstanding. In 
contrast, they aim to build a new corpus of data and knowledge aimed at predicting crimes. Or 
                                                 
33Brian Massumi, “Potential politics and the primacy of preemption”, Theory & Event, 10 no. 2 (2007), accessed 
August 10, 2016: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/218091. https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.2007.0066.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 For applications of Massumi’s theory to data based prediction, see for example Louise Amoore, The Politics of 
Possibility: Risk and Security beyond Probability (Duke University Press, 2013) or Matthias Leese, “Seeing Futures’ - 
Politics of Visuality and Affect,” in Algorithmic Life: Calculative Devices in the Age of Big Data, ed. Louise Amoore 
and Volha Piotukh (Milton Park/New York: Routledge, 2016), 148–64. 
Foucault Studies, No. 23, pp. 27-45 
 41 
rather, as we can now see using Foucault’s concepts, this knowledge aims not so much at the pre-
diction of criminal acts, but at the identification of particular lives.  
Using elements from Foucault’s reading of delinquency, we can see that this new form of 
knowledge is neither fully describable using the logic of prevention nor that of preemption. At 
first glance, a continuation of the logic of delinquency to assess lives in order to detect criminals 
before they act corresponds to what Massumi calls prevention. But Foucault shows that the estab-
lishment of the criminal as existing before the act is not just a matter of linking cause and effect. It 
is the result of a shift in the meaning of criminality and its defining aspect from a particular deed 
to specific forms of biographies and social circumstances. Those can be identified based on a cor-
pus of data and a corresponding new form of knowledge that can assess and classify them.  
There is a multifarious discourse that relates current forms of policing and the implied 
concept of criminality to an actuarial or managerial logic, which is again based on statistics, but 
without a focus on individual lives. Rather, it has been analyzed using Foucault’s motives of gov-
ernmentality and technologies of the self.37 Also, the underlying statistical practices and actuarial 
knowledges have been described as a mechanism of governmentality.38 However, this focus on 
Foucauldian concepts is not without its critics, who argue that a more detailed sociological 
grounding is necessary.39 This would mean a further distance from the logic of delinquency. Con-
sequently, there are contemporary analyses of algorithmic technologies and prediction that hold 
that subjectivation is not the central issue, but rather the management or policing of environ-
ments, contexts, spaces.40 However, as the examples in section 4.1. show, with the advent of data 
analysis at scale, a focus on the individual case, on individualized approaches of policing, border 
controls, and security checks re-emerges – even tied to the hope that these checks on a supra-
individual level will eventually become obsolete. Data-based processes deal increasingly with 
individual bodies and lives.41 
In this regard, the structure identified in Foucault’s analysis of delinquency retains im-
portance because it allows to show that rather than attempting to find specific causes for a sub-
ject’s criminal behavior, a new individualizing form of criminal subjectivity is created. Massumi 
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argues that preemption builds on the logic of uncertainty. We do not know what will happen and 
who will do it. Yet this is linked to the implied certainty that it can happen every time. Thus, the 
threat is already present. This is the justification of preemptive action, and the reason why 
preemption creates its own cause. To some extent, predictive data-based methods do that as well, 
yet not by preemptive action but by creating a corpus of knowledge about what is already pre-
sent: individuals and their biographies. These methods create suspects as the particular, individu-
alized, current form of a (future) threat. Data promises access to what is already present, i.e. the 
suspects rather than the future acts; maybe in the form of a pattern or relation we had not yet no-
ticed.  
The punitive system has allowed the creation of a corpus of knowledge that started from 
convicts and used the emergent human sciences to establish new means of classification, which 
would eventually be those that figured in courts and laws. Data-based prediction promises a 
similar set of knowledge that again analyzes lives, like in delinquency. Following this logic, the 
suspect, in particular, is not someone who will commit a crime, but someone whose life exhibits a 
certain pattern. This is, however, no continuous biographical writing nor circumspect psychologi-
cal study. It is a sampling, a collection of all kinds of data points as has been shown above. Never-
theless, it is in the same regard a corpus of knowledge that establishes the presence of the crimi-
nal before the act.  
Thus the uncertainty of the threat is not absolute. It is, after all, modelled after examples of 
terrorist attacks and similar events. It contains an uncertainty because something like this could 
happen everywhere and does not need overly suspicious acts of preparation, etc. But it is done, 
we learn, by specific people: youngsters playing videogames, social outcasts recruited on twitter, 
persons with particular travelling patterns, etc. This might also explain the prevailing preoccupa-
tion that every terrorist or violent act needs a “mastermind” – a person who incorporates these 
features, even if the concrete organizational structure of terrorist plots can be quite different.42 At 
the very least there need to be connections to a suspicious, dark background. They cannot be the 
spontaneous acts of an otherwise normal person – which would be a real “unknown unknown”.  
Yet the uncertainty and potentiality of the threat, which Massumi highlights, remain im-
portant for this analysis because they legitimize the circumspect collection of data. The same cor-
pus of knowledge that establishes suspects as identifiable patterns also shows that these patterns 
constantly change and need updates. The particular relations of different events, behaviors, and 
activities that make up a suspect are not known in advance, particularly because they do not stand 
in a causal relation.43 Yet new technologies imply that they can be discerned by algorithms that 
detect regularities, rules, patterns, and correlations. However, since it is not known in advance 
which of those elements will prove to be significant, all pertinent data is necessary. And since the 
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focus of the analysis is not criminal acts but the particular lives of suspects, all data that concerns 
their lives is pertinent. This legitimizes the circumspect collection of data.  
Similar to the discussion of the flexible and dynamic creation of norms in the last section, 
we are dealing with a heterogeneous, discontinuous version of what Foucault described. There 
are no more “natural classes” to be discerned, but particular subsets of lives and particularities of 
behavior that themselves have become dynamic and consequently have to be continuously traced. 
Furthermore, some of the measures taken as a consequence of data-based prediction deviate 
strongly from the program of correction that was the aim of the punitive system. In contrast, 
many of those who are identified as suspects today are persons that are kept outside of Europe 
and North America. They can be detained in illegal camps like Guantanamo. They can even be 
killed – as Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA and the CIA openly confirmed – based on 
(meta-)data.44 Here the difference between Deleuze’s society of control, in which lives in the co-
herent sense in which they figure in Foucault’s discussion of delinquency are no longer im-
portant, and the lives on the fringes or outsets of these societies becomes salient again. The liberal 
subjects described by Deleuze are constantly adapting to “dividualized” measures and data 
points without aiming at biographical coherence. Yet the suspects that are established as threaten-
ing these societies must exhibit features that define their lives. This is not a definition in the full 
sense that a closed institution like the punitive system in the 18th century allowed – but in a cir-





In the light of the discussion of data-based surveillance in the last sections, requesting oversight 
in the form of opening black boxes, of gaining transparency and insight into surveilling technolo-
gies is a limited if not problematic approach.  
Section 4.1 shows that the subjectivating effects of algorithmic systems cannot be reduced 
to what the algorithm does. Its outcome is based on many measurements (moments of writing or 
sampling data) and actions carried out based on the evaluations that these data enable. Those 
moments are temporarily and spatially distributed. Although this distribution is no longer linear 
and regular, these moments all potentially contribute to subjectivation. Even a single data-based 
judgment at a border, for example, can exert subjectivating power. Some are still repeatedly ex-
posed to such moments, for example when every flight implies lengthy additional security checks 
that clearly separate those who need and those who need not submit to such procedures. Opening 
black boxes and transparency can deliver important information about how these judgments 
come to pass. But it cannot provide answers as to whether such subjectivating moments should be 
possible in the first place, or who, where, and when it should be allowed to carry out the respec-
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tive actions, etc. In particular, some approaches to transparency, regarding questions of whether 
the subjects are judged correctly, disavow these subjectivating processes by implicitly presuppos-
ing a subject that could be represented in data.  
This is complemented by section 4.2, which shows transparency and insight as too limited 
in a further respect: it often focuses on data collected about those who are eventually assessed 
using this data. To the contrary, everybody whose data is collected is implicated by the ensuing 
relations of power – first of all by enabling the new forms of subjectivity, here called suspects, by 
contributing data. Yet, this feeds back on the perception of normalcy. In consequence, what it 
means to be an orderly citizen is increasingly based on the same processes of knowledge creation 
as the moments of establishing suspects. Data can be used to quite different aims, ranging from 
flexible self-normalization and the policing of populations to the disciplinary separation of the 
normal from the abnormal based on individual cases. All these activities are based on the same 
submission to the circumspect collection of data – following the logic that all data is pertinent. 
Section 4.3 continues this argument by showing that data-based surveillance technologies 
aiming at identifying potential future criminals constitute a particular form of subjectivity: the 
suspect. It is related to certain patterns in the lives of individuals and social circumstances that 
gain their meaning only by first grasping them in the form of data and second collecting and or-
ganizing that data in a particular fashion. Rather than asking whether such algorithms identify 
the right persons or correctly predict future deeds, the relevant question is whether we want such 
a new form of subjectivity as well as the ensuing power relations to emerge and to determine our 
lives. This becomes particularly problematic because many of the technologies discussed here are 
used to police the borders of societies of control where a perspective on individuals that are sub-
jected concerning their entire lives still remains important – and not just the control of dividual-
ized data points that determines life within societies of control. Here, a parallelism emerges when 
the societies of control produce all kinds of data on dividuals that can, however, be appropriated 
and harnessed towards subjectivizing – disciplinary – effects. This directly influences current pro-
cedures of oversight and transparency, which are very often limited to ascertaining that no rights 
of the citizens of the particular state are violated. 
This does not mean that there is no sense in opening black boxes. For example, it has been 
uncovered that an algorithm used to judge recidivism among prison inmates had a quite different 
distribution of the risk factors it assigned to whites and people of color than the actual recidivism 
rates a few years later.45 But it would be wrong to conclude that we only need better insights in 
the working of the algorithm in order to build a better – unbiased – one. Requests for transparen-
cy always imply that we have a measure to judge what we see once the insight is granted. How-
ever, there is no measure for data-based judgments of suspicion, because the very knowledge that 
allows such judgments emerges with the algorithms and data-collections that should be judged. 
Instead, the underlying effects on the meaning of recidivism, how the knowledge about this 
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comes to pass, how a new “kind” of subject – the numerically determinable suspect – emerges, 
should be at the center of inquiry. In particular, we need to ask who gains power over these sub-
jects and how this is legitimized. Knowing how an algorithm works alone can never answer these 
questions, particularly since a lot of the power relations and their legitimization is derived from 
data. That does not just mean that the outcome of the algorithm depends on the data themselves. 
A lot of the legitimization of data-based surveillance stems from the claim to own particular kinds 
of data, to be able to organize and analyze them in a particular way (using automated algorithms) 
and to discern a particular new form of life: the suspect. Thus, opening black boxes is an im-
portant element for an ethics or governance of algorithms. However, it has to be embedded in a 
larger social, institutional, and technical picture that analyzes shifts in power and subjectivities 
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